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GLOBAL ARAB WORLD MIGRATIONS
AND DIASPORAS
Louise Cainkar

Don’t live in the world as if you were renting or here only for the summer,
but act as if it was your [mother’s] house.
—Nazim Hikmet

This article provides a comprehensive overview of the quantitative dimensions of contemporary Arab world migrations and diasporas, as well as
a commentary on qualitative dimensions of pertinent English-language
scholarship.1 It offers a global context within which scholars may situate
their work in order to enhance communication and comparability across
scholarly disciplines and regions. Scholars who study Arab world migrations and diasporas in Europe are not often in conversation with those
studying these migrations and diasporas in North America or in the Gulf
states. The same can be said for scholars who study Arab world migrations and diasporas in Malaysia, China, or Australia, as well as South
America, Africa, or the Caribbean. Similarly, scholars approaching these
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topics from the paradigms of postcolonial theory, anthropology, cultural
studies, demography, history, comparative literature, or sociology do not
often enough engage relevant scholarship outside of their paradigm. Only
occasionally do scholars of different disciplines gather together to present
their work at scholarly meetings, and even then we seem to speak different
languages.2 Disciplinary differences are healthy and important for the range
of perspectives they contribute, but an overarching framework—such as
the one offered here—will better enable us to make comparisons across
place, time, and social contexts, and to deploy our conceptual categories
“in a relational manner.”3
Developing such an overview of current Arab migrations and diasporas requires acknowledging the serious limitations inherent to the task.
Demographic data are always subject to both random and systematic error;
accuracy in migrant demography is especially elusive. Terminology and
measurement tools vary according to who is doing the counting and how
they construct their categories. Since demography is always connected to
place, dominant ideologies, laws, categories, and nomenclatures where the
counting occurs introduce variations. Demographic statistics speak to those
who have been counted; there are many reasons why migrants might evade
enumeration, for example, due to legal or political status. Furthermore, in
some enumerations persons born on a state’s soil are considered “foreign-born”
if they maintain the nationality of their parents and have not naturalized,
while other states may count them as “native-born.” These variations are
tied to state ideologies of nation and citizenship and corresponding rules
concerning naturalization (where available), thus making it difficult to
compare quantitatively across sites.
The numbers provided in this article can offer a general framework for
understanding the breadth and character of Arab world migrations and
diasporas today. However, it is incumbent on specialists of each migrant
location to do the tough investigative work needed for quantitative precision
and comparability, including revealing those who are uncounted. Finally,
demographic data on migrants tend to be organized by country of birth,
potentially masking meaningful distinctions between different groups
from the same country of origin. Although the data presented here were
tabulated and published (by others) as Arab migration data, I use the term
“Arab world migration” to highlight that we are not necessarily describing
cultural or ethnic groups, but people who come from a particular place.
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There are many indigenous and diasporic peoples living in, moving through,
and leaving the Arab world who are not “Arabs,” such as Berbers, Kurds,
Armenians, Assyrians, and Circassians, to name a few.
In the process of searching for comparable quantitative data, I discovered
that categories of quantification have a reifying tendency that has infected
our qualitative research as well. These categories direct our gaze in specific
ways that cause us to highlight certain matters while overlooking others,
creating an overall imbalanced body of scholarly literature on Arab world
migrations and diasporas. This imbalance is particularly notable when one
compares the English-language scholarly literature on Arab world migrants
living within the Arab world to that on Arab world migrants living outside of
it. In the case of the former, the dominant focus is on state policies, occupations, labor conditions, and remittances while the latter tends to emphasize
social, cultural, and political struggles, adaptations, constructed memories,
and hybridities. This pattern of scholarship might make sense if we believe
that official categories of migrants should drive our intellectual curiosities,
but my argument is that when we do so, we miss a lot.
Categories and Paradigms
Although migration is a perennial human phenomenon, it was not systematically and globally tabulated until the twentieth century. This era was
characterized by decolonization and the creation of scores of formally and
often arbitrarily bounded nation-states; global wars and mass movements
of displaced persons; the formation of the United Nations and its affiliated
agencies; the development of and implementation of rules concerning
identity cards, official travel documents, and visas, with corresponding
intra- and inter-state controls on human movement; and the construction
of technical categorizations of people in motion. Akin to the development
processes of earlier nation-states, new ruling powers and dominant groups
defined the boundaries of human membership in the state—conferring or
denying legal, social, and cultural citizenship—and constructing imaginaries
of national identity intended to supersede all other identities. They thereby
created and solidified socially constructed distinctions between insiders
and outsiders. Over time, international organizations and state authorities
developed technical categories to distinguish between types of migrants,
and then scholars increasingly referred to international migrants by the
categories the latter inhabited. They made distinctions between permanent
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and temporary, forced and voluntary, refugee and asylee, documented and
undocumented, labor migrant, student migrant, family migrant, guest, alien,
tourist, resident, and citizen. These categorizations, however, obscured
migrants’ shared qualities.
The quantitative overview of current Arab world migrations and diasporas presented here utilizes the broad UN definition of “migrant”—“any
person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (usually excluding
visitors, business travelers, and students, among others). The qualitative
discussion also eschews the technical subcategories in order to highlight
how the reification of categories operates in scholarly work. We do risk
displacing some important specificities in the process, something Shami
has called “erasure through inclusion” when discussing the anthropological
treatment of the refugee in the transnational paradigm:
Just like everyone else, if more so, the refugee is mobile, uprooted,
dislocated, and lonely. . . . [T]he refugee is simply one of many who
travel this landscape, together with tourists, guest workers, exiles,
business consultants, expatriate experts, roving academics, and the
like. The fact that the refugee appears as a term couched between
other terms of mobile existence is erasure through inclusion.4
Yet if my objective is developing an overarching framework that will
allow us to make comparisons across place, time, and social context, I believe
distinctions should at least initially be left behind. Diaspora studies scholars
similarly engage in collapsing categories when they treat multiple generations
as a single transnational unit, since the diasporic subject is defined not by
physical movement per se but by identification with and social and emotional
ties to the homeland.5 For example, Safran’s framework for a diaspora’s
defining characteristics include: dispersion from an original center, collective memory of homeland, social distance from the host society, communally
shared hope for return, and solidarity around commitment to building the
homeland.6 Ho’s work takes a different angle all together, demonstrating
how “absence shapes the diasporic experience. . . . To be in one place is to be
absent everywhere else.”7 Sociologists who focus on “transnational social
fields”8 often collapse subject categories in favor of networks and linkages
while sociologists interested in the relationship between identity and culture
consider it important to distinguish between migrant generations. They
assert that persons who have left their homelands as adults have qualita-
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tively different experiences from those born in the “host” country, and the
experiences of subsequent generations are in turn different from both of
the aforementioned groups.9 Brubaker believes that the diaspora concept
has been deployed too broadly, as it has been applied “essentially to any
and every nameable population category that is to some extent dispersed
in space.” For him, the concept loses its meaning when groups like “labour
migrants who maintain (to some degree) emotional and social ties with a
homeland,”10 are captured within it.
While these theoretical and conceptual discussions and debates are
important for refining our scholarly work, they do not bring us closer to a
comprehensive and comparative overview in which to situate it. Being clear
about whom we are speaking is crucial to our ability to make global and
cross-cultural comparisons; the danger comes when categories become reified
and the shared qualities of migrants are obscured. When official statuses
and state policies shape the parameters of our research queries—instead
of being viewed as the producers of variation that they are—questions are
asked about one migrant type that are not asked of another. In fact, every
categorical type and every generation of migrant, and non-migrants alike,
makes similar demands of their social conditions, the minimum of which
is human dignity. Although our perspectives and conceptual schemes
may differ, much of our scholarly work on the Arab migrant and diasporic
subject shares a qualitative theme or problematic rooted in the concept of
human dignity, and it is through this commonality that we can engage each
other’s work. It is this very dignity that most often eludes migrants when
they take on the status of stranger. Nazim Hikmet’s poetic call to live as if
at home, and not a visitor, crystallizes a key challenge for migrants of any
generation: finding dignity, security, solace, rootedness, and happiness
outside one’s symbolic “mother’s house,” is especially difficult when one is
seen by others as temporary, merely a renter.
Human Dignity
The concept of human dignity can encompass most of our disciplinary
concerns and provide a framework for cross-disciplinary communication. Economist Amartya Sen and philosopher Martha Nussbaum define
human dignity as the ability to act on one’s human capabilities. It lies in
possessing the agency to express oneself politically, civilly, socially, and
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culturally without arbitrary encumbrances or economic barriers.11 The
crafters of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as scholars
such as Karl Marx recognized human dignity as the fundamental concept
undergirding human rights and equality. Journalist Anthony Shadid, at
the height of the Egyptian uprising, articulated dignity as the opposite of
humiliation and hopelessness, something denied when the pursuit of one’s
most basic dreams has been circumscribed:
“Dignity” (karamah) was a word often used Wednesday [2 February
2011], and its emphasis underlined the breadth of a movement that is,
so far, leaderless. Neither the Brotherhood nor a handful of opposition
leaders—men like Mohammed ElBaradei or Ayman Nour—have
managed to articulate hopelessness, the humiliations at the hands of
the police and the outrage at having too little money to marry, echoed
in the streets of Palestinian camps in Jordan and in the urban misery
of Baghdad’s Sadr City.12
Human dignity is a useful overarching term because it does not distinguish between colonial, postcolonial, diasporic, or transnational subjects.
It does not distinguish between migrant and non-migrant, documented or
undocumented migrant, first- or second-generation migrant, voluntary or
forced migrant, labor or family migrant, permanent or temporary migrant.
A dignified state of being might be considered the opposite of otherness, a
social position that conscribes agency and allows the powerful to commit
acts of degradation. Dignity includes being able to live in a place where
no one feels free to spit on you or to call your children terrorists. Dignity
precludes distributing civil and political rights according to a dress code,
preferred language, socioeconomic status, or hegemonic lifestyle.
Human dignity transcends borders, but when borders become sites of
exclusion, dignity is one of the first sites of battle. Migrants of any type and
all generations seek a life of dignity and the freedom to construct a world
that offers a sense of safety, some of the comforts of the familiar, the chance
to provide life’s fundamental necessities for self and others, and access to
the resources to advance their capabilities. Yet they often discover a world
of boundaries and exclusions, a condition that may hold true whether they
are officially welcomed or spurned, temporary or permanent, an immigrant,
refugee, asylee, or guest worker, and whether they are wealthy, middle-class,
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or poor. Although financial resources can surely help to ease some of the pain
and disruptions caused by the migratory experience, dignity is something
that cannot be purchased. Indeed, the migrant’s quest for human dignity
is different only in context from that of every human being.
One way of thinking about human dignity and its relationship to migrations and diasporas within and outside of the Arab world is to cast off analytic, conceptual, and technical categories of migrations and diasporas and
think instead of migration and the popular revolutions that have occurred
across the Arab world (often referred to as “the Arab Spring”) as two sides
of the same coin. Migration and revolution are acts of human agency that
demand more. Both emerge from discontent with authoritarianism, corruption, blocked aspirations, obstructed possibilities, and social inequalities, and the loss of a sense of agency that accompanies these conditions.
Neither migration nor revolution is principally a response to poverty, even
though high levels of it may be present. Indeed, research shows that it is
not the poorest members of any society that are likely to lead revolutions
or to migrate, in part because of the greater damage done to their agency.
Only at poignant, some call them epic, historic moments do sweeping waves
of popular rebellions such as “the Arab Spring” occur. Migration, on the
other hand, is a type of unremitting human rebellion. It is the perennial
and persistent, indeed unstoppable, human quest for dignity and autonomy.
While the place in which the migrant lands, the way in which s/he arrives,
and the paperwork s/he carries may determine his or her category as a
migrant, the quest of all migrants is the same.
Arab World Defined
In contemporary usage, “the Arab world” defines the territories of the
twenty-two members of the League of Arab States, with a population of
some 318.5 million persons.13 Members include: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Scholars often describe these areas regionally,
using the concepts Arab Maghrib, Arab Mashriq, and the Gulf states. The
Arab Maghrib (west) is commonly understood as composed of Morocco,
Western Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Libya. The Arab Mashriq
(east) is understood as composed of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria,
and Yemen, and on occasion Egypt. Scholars often refer to the Levant (or
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eastern Mediterranean), a place of significant historic emigration, politically
organized under the Ottoman Empire as Bilad al-Sham or Greater Syria,
including contemporary Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and historic Palestine. The
Gulf states are the Arab states on the Arabian Peninsula save Yemen, and
are synonymous with the current members of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates. Scholars deploy other geographic terms including North Africa (the
Arab Maghrib plus Egypt and Sudan), the “Middle East” (the Arab Mashriq,
GCC, and Israel and often encompassing a larger area that is not solely Arab),
and the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Djibouti, as well as non-Arab League
members Eritrea and Ethiopia). The Comoros Islands are situated off the
southeast coast of Africa. Scholars may critique the composition of each
of these geographic categories because they are social constructions that
rely on assumptions about the salient meaning of particular histories and
features. In particular, “the Middle East” is a highly problematic category
because its definition and scope vary widely, usually based on criteria of
importance to external actors and interests. Furthermore, the political/territorial boundaries of all of these nation-states were socially and in many
cases arbitrarily constructed, largely by colonial powers.
With regard to major migration patterns, some of these countries are
migrant-exporting states while others are migrant-importing states. The
countries with relatively high rates of emigration are Algeria, Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and
Yemen. The GCC states and Libya (until 2012) are major migrant importing
states. The terminology I use in this article is largely that of data collectors
and demographic analysts and is clearly defined in its context.
Arab World Migration Overview
Globally some 214 million people lived as international migrants—persons
who have changed their country of usual residence—in 2010. This is about
3.1 percent of the world’s population or one of every thirty-two persons.14
The geographic spread of these migrants is wider than at any prior historical
time and the value of their remittances has increased exponentially over the
past few decades. A range of new and old factors shape the movement patterns of today’s international migrants: geographic proximity, concerns for
safety, historic economic relationships, state policies, political and economic
conditions, family reunification, natural disasters, war, social networks,
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knowledge of work opportunities, availability of visas, international agencies, labor recruiters, and human traffickers. Some four percent of persons
originating in an Arab state are international migrants including, most
notably, one of every thirteen Lebanese.15
Table 1: Current International Migrants from the Arab World
Estimated Total

Proportion of Current
Arab World Migrants

Current Arab World Migrantsa

13 million

Inside the Arab Worldb

5.85 million

45 percent

Outside the Arab Worldc

7.15 million

55 percent

OECD Countriesd

4.9 million

38 percent

In France

2.3 million

In “Countries of Immigration”

980,000

Rest of World

2.3 million

18 percent

Compiled by Louise Cainkar from comparable sources.
a
International Organization of Migration, “Intra-Regional Labour Mobility in the Arab World
Facts and Figures, Cairo.” Development Research Centre, Global Migrant Origin Database,
Updated March 2007. http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigration/global_
migrant_origin_database.html [2000 census data. Foreign born.]
b
Ibid.
c
Jean-Christophe Dumont, Immigrants from Arab Countries to the OECD: From the Past to the
Future. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in
the Arab Region, 2006. UN/POP/EGM/2006/11.
d
Ibid.

Of the estimated thirteen million current Arab world international
migrants, fifty-five percent (7.15 million) live outside of the Arab world.16
They are significantly concentrated in the western European and North
American countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD).17 The remaining forty-five percent (5.85 million)
live in the Arab world.18 Nearly seventy percent of migrants from the Arab
Maghrib live in Europe, although some one million of them live in other
Arab countries.19 On the other hand, nearly seventy percent of migrants from
the Arab Mashriq (which the IOM defines as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon,
the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syria, and Yemen) live in the Arab
world, mostly in GCC countries.20
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The term “current” used here is slightly misleading and highlights
some of the problems with quantitative data on migrant populations. There
are plenty of statistics available on international migrants from a range of
sources. However, few of these are comparable across time and place. The
data that are comparable, because they are based on similar definitions
and sources, are from the OECD, the UN, or the Development Research
Centre’s Global Migrant Origin database. While publications may use the
term “current migrants” in a 2006 or 2010 report, all of these reports draw
their data from information collected on “immigrant stocks” (foreignborn) in national censuses conducted around the year 2000.21 Certainly,
these data must be treated with skepticism, as they are subject to the errors
common to censuses and to statistics on migrants. However, until we have
better comparable data, this information can provide us with a sense of the
proportion, range, and variation of Arab world migrations and diasporas.22
Arab World Migrations and Diasporas Outside the Arab
World: Demographic and Social Parameters
Fifty-five percent of current international migrants from the Arab world live
outside of the region; the majority live in Europe, and some sixty percent
live in the developed market economies of the OECD countries. Nearly half
of all Arab world migrants in OECD countries live in France (2.3 million
in 2000, or forty-eight percent) while the second largest group lives in the
United States, but at a rate four times lower than in France, 11.6 percent.23
The following countries were home to ninety percent of current migrants
from Arab countries living in the OECD (in descending order): France, the
United States, Spain, Italy, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Australia, Sweden, and Belgium. Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians were
fully seventy percent of Arab world migrants in OECD countries, while
another twenty percent were Iraqis, Egyptians, and Lebanese.24 Dumont
predicted in 2006 that if current trends continued, Moroccans would be
one out of two Arab world migrants in the OECD by 2010.25 The majority of
Arab world migrants to OECD countries are men. However, women from
the Arab world have migrated to these countries at substantially higher
rates than to other Arab countries.26 While nearly half of all Algerian and
Libyan migrants were female (the global norm is forty-nine percent), the
gendered migration rates for other Arab countries ranged from thirty to
forty-seven percent female. At the lower end of the scale, women were less
than forty percent of migrants over age fifteen from Jordan, Oman, the
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Palestinian territories, Yemen, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. Data on
self-identified Arabs living in the United States (native- and foreign-born)
also show striking gender imbalances: fifty-seven percent of them are male,
and nearly seventy percent are male in the thirty-five to thirty-nine age
group. These imbalances do not even out until after the age of sixty-four.27
Striking differences in socio-political context and socioeconomic
characteristics emerge when the dominant trends for Arab world migrants
living in Europe are compared to those living in the OECD “countries of
immigration”—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
These differences include migration history, state ideology, immigration
policies, place of origin, human capital, employment, proportionate share
of the population, and naturalization rates. These dissimilarities must
certainly matter to the qualitative experiences of these migrants, but we
have not done sufficient comparative work to specify precisely how they
matter. At the same time, there are some overarching similarities across
these countries that have increased in momentum over the past decade. I
provide broad outlines of these differences and similarities below in an
effort to encourage more comparative thinking among scholars of Arab
world migrations and diasporas.
Arab world migration to Europe is a predominantly although not
exclusively postcolonial movement from the Maghrib, which has shaped
the sociopolitical conditions in which these migrants live. Significant
exceptions to this pattern include Yemeni and Somali migrations to the
United Kingdom, Lebanese migrations to France, and Arab refugee resettlements in Scandinavia. Maghribi men and women moved north across
the Mediterranean in large numbers prior to and after World War II, when
they were recruited as “guest workers.”28 Their days as colonial subjects
still fresh, they took up social positions in their new countries of residence
as workers who were offered a lesser set of rights than citizens. After the
1973 oil embargo and rising fuel prices, the demand for workers in Europe
fell substantially (as it simultaneously increased in GCC countries). New
immigration policies across Europe prioritized family reunification over
importing workers, although in the context of widely varying and often quite
restrictive citizenship and naturalization policies, none of which included
birthright citizenship (jus soli).29 Indeed, statistics on these groups need
to be examined deeply due to varying and shifting policies concerning
naturalization and citizenship. For example, one must attend to whether
statistics on “Moroccans” apply only to the foreign-born or to multiple
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generations, including the native-born lacking citizenship. 30 Master narratives in the dominant cultures of most European states continued to
maintain a colonial flavor that included racialized notions of Arab and
Muslim inferiority. State actors and citizens used these to justify the continuing social, cultural, civic, and political exclusion of these populations.
Unmet expectations that migrants and their children should assimilate to
the dominant culture bolstered their claims that these “newcomers” are
unwilling to integrate socially and “fit in.”
Current Arab migration to the so-called OECD “countries of immigration”—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand—is relatively
small when compared to migration to Europe and within the Arab world.
For example, statistics from 2000 placed the total number of migrants from
the Arab world in all of these countries combined at about 983,000, or less
then half the number in France alone.31 The ideological context for Arab
migrants living in the “countries of immigration” is qualitatively different
from that of Europe. In the former, population replacement (instead of
work) guided by the racial ideology of white superiority was integral to
their settler-colonial foundation. State policies promoted the aggressive
replacement of indigenous populations through isolation and erasure, on
the one hand, and open door in-migration for individual and family “white”
migrants on the other. Perquisites offered initially only to “whites” included
both naturalized and birthright (jus soli) citizenship, as well as scores of
additional privileges, such as voting, legal, and homesteading rights. 32
For these reasons, Arab migrants’ experiences were deeply influenced by
whether they were considered white or not (and this varied) by their new
host countries. Over time, racialized ideas have lessened their grip on
immigration and naturalization policies in these countries. At the same
time, birthright citizenship has been revoked in Australia (as of 1986, it is
acquired on the tenth birthday of a child born in Australia regardless of the
parents’ citizenship status) and New Zealand (as of 2006 at least one parent
must be a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident).
These “countries of immigration” have more recently reconfigured
their dominant ideologies to define and promote themselves as sites of
ingathering for multiple ethnic groups, cultures, and races, and have more
accessible naturalization policies than in Europe. The context of reception
for migrants in these countries has been strikingly different from that in
Europe, particularly in economic and cultural domains.33 Although each
of these states has a dominant white Christian culture that migrants are
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expected to admire and emulate, a continuum of hybrid and resistance
cultures seems to be more socially tolerated in these places, ideologically at
least, and especially in urban areas.34 So while notions of “race” and ideas
around membership and belonging matter significantly in both European
countries and the countries of immigration, how they matter and how
they manifest themselves in daily life appear to vary—or do they? More
comparative research is needed to tease out the similarities and differences
across these regions. General indications are that Arab migrants overall fare
better economically in the countries of immigration, but questions remain
as to how much this economic success matters to social and political status.
Does economic strength translate into any kind of power? And if not, why?
The demographic profile of migrants from the Arab world living in
the “countries of immigration” is quite different from that of those living
in Europe in terms of countries of origin and human capital (education
and skills). In the former, they are more likely to be from the Mashriq,
especially Lebanon and Egypt, followed by Syria, Palestine, and Iraq, than
from Maghribi countries. An exception is Canada, where migrants from
Morocco and Algeria make up about ten percent of the Arab origin population (native- and foreign-born). They are characterized by neither a postcolonial relationship nor a historic guest worker status. Overall, migrants
from the Arab world in the above four countries are more likely to be
skilled, highly educated, and actively employed than those living in Europe,
especially in European countries where they have a longer history, such as
France and Belgium.35 For example, eighty-four percent of self-identified
Arabs (native- and foreign-born) ages twenty-five and older in the United
States had a high school diploma (higher than the overall US population, at
eighty percent). Forty-one percent had at least a bachelor’s degree, significantly higher than that of the US population overall (twenty-four percent),
a figure that bears out for each individual Arab country of origin group.36
Similarly, Canadians of Arab origin (native- and foreign-born) were twice
as likely as other Canadians to have completed a university degree (thirty
percent compared to fifteen percent) and to hold a graduate degree.37 On
the other hand, migrants from the Maghrib to the OECD countries, the
overwhelming majority of whom are in Europe, show much lower levels of
human capital.38 Some sixty-three percent of migrants from Morocco, and
fifty-six percent from Algeria and Tunisia, have not completed a high school
education and less than twenty percent of each group has had at least two
years of college education.39
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Labor force participation rates show some significant differences when
comparing the longer established Maghribi communities in Europe with
more recent Arab migrants in the countries of immigration. The labor force
participation rate of Moroccans (foreign-born and native-born without
citizenship) in Belgium was thirty-five percent overall and fourteen percent
for women,40 as compared to seventy-one percent for Moroccan men and
fifty-three percent for Moroccan women in the United States (foreign- and
native-born), rates that were quite similar to the US population as a whole.41
Among self-identified Arabs in the United States aged sixteen and older,
the labor force participation rate of men was higher than that of the total
population (seventy-three percent compared with seventy-one percent) while
the labor force participation rate of women was lower than for women in
the total population (forty-six percent compared with fifty-eight percent).
In Canada, people of Arab origin aged fifteen and over are somewhat less
likely to be employed than Canadians overall—fifty-six percent as compared
to sixty-two percent of all Canadian adults—although this difference is
mainly due to the lower labor force participation rates of Arab women.42
It is generally true that people (including migrants) with higher skill
and education levels (human capital) fare better economically, and this
pattern holds true for Arab world migrants. Highly skilled Arab world
migrants living in Europe do well, but the majority of them do not share
this human capital profile.43 As a result of these differences in human capital
and employment rates, Arab world migrants in Europe are far more likely to
be low-income than those in the countries of immigration. These descriptors, however, require a deeper examination of why these differences exist.
What respective roles do immigration and naturalization policies, history,
ideology, proximity, opportunity, segmented labor markets, and discrimination play in producing these outcomes? Despite some differences across
Arab countries in terms of educational attainment, all Arab countries have
populations with both high and low levels of education. This indicates that
social mobility in host countries is partly determined by immigration and
recruitment policies, state ideologies, and employment and educational
opportunities.44
Another critical difference between Arab world migrants in Europe and
the “countries of immigration” lies in their relative share of the population.
In the latter, (self-identified) foreign- and native-born Arabs combined
constitute less than two percent of the population—less than one percent in
the United States,45 and 1.2 percent in Canada and Australia—substantially
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lower than the figures for the Arab world foreign-born alone in a number of
European countries.46 Persons from Arab countries are a significant proportion of the foreign-born in the following European countries: forty percent
in France, sixteen percent in Spain, fourteen percent in the Netherlands,
Belgium, and Italy, twelve percent in Denmark, and eleven percent in
Sweden.47 Additionally, the overwhelming majority of Arab world migrants
in Europe are Muslim, while Christians are a substantial proportion of Arab
world migrants in the countries of immigration. Social research tells us that
a potentially toxic combination emerges when significant demographic
proportions (the sociological “tipping point”), low incomes, and negative
social constructions of a group intersect. Communities characterized by
these features tend to become concentrated in urban ghettoes, locked out
of upward mobility, and socially crystallized as the other, conditions that
supply more traction to the notion that they pose a “cultural threat” to
established communities and ways of life. These overall demographic differences in proportion of the population, income, educational attainment,
and labor force participation between Arab world migrants in Europe and
in the countries of immigration—holding constant prejudice, racism, and
Islamophobia—render their ghettoization, social exclusion, and downward
mobility more likely in Europe and their capacities to resist negative treatment lower.48 Even so, the body of social research tells us that communities
stand up to these degradations and assert their dignity, that they create
cultures of resistance, and that an ensuing two-way dialectic of rejection
and acceptance ebbs and flows according to broader social pressures.
Finally, migrants from the Arab world in the “countries of immigration”
are more likely to obtain naturalized citizenship and to have political rights
than those living in European countries, where naturalization policies are
generally more limiting.49 For example, seventy-five percent of persons in
the United States who self-identified as Arabs were US citizens: forty-six
percent of these were native-born (either in the United States or abroad to
US citizen parents) and twenty-eight percent were Arab world foreign-born
(2000 data). More than half of the foreign-born Arabs were naturalized
citizens, a higher proportion than the overall US foreign-born population,
for whom forty percent were naturalized citizens.50 More telling, the Arab
groups with large proportions of non-citizens—Iraqis and Moroccans
at forty-five percent—were also the most likely to be recent immigrants,
implying that naturalization is only a matter of time. In comparison, only
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about twenty-seven percent of the foreign-born from Algeria, twenty-six
percent from Morocco, and forty percent from Tunisia have French citizenship, while these figures are higher for Lebanese, Syrians, and Egyptians.51
The increasingly restrictive naturalization policies of many European states,
often tied to proof of language acquisition and cultural assimilation, suggest
that migrants and their children in these places are required to choose
between mirroring the dominant culture or accepting a lesser social and
political status.
The significant differences between Europe and the “countries of immigration” in social context and socioeconomic and political characteristics of
migrants are highly likely to matter to the qualitative experiences of Arab
migrants and their children. However, researchers can only specify the ways
in which they matter when they do the comparative work the task requires.
In addition, there are likely to be meaningful differences across these countries; the master categories of “Europe” and “countries of immigration” are
helpful for analysis yet obscure internal variations. These differences aside,
all of the countries discussed above as dominant locations of migrations
outside of the Arab world share the phenomena of heightened anti-Arab
racism and anti-Muslim social agitation.52
As activists who are proponents of hostile attitudes toward Arabs and
Muslims increasingly connect globally, an unsettling similarity is emerging
across Europe and the “countries of immigration.” This was evidenced in
the United States, for example, at the 2011 King hearings in the US House
of Representatives on whether native-born US Muslims are a source of
threat, a topic long discussed in Europe. Thus, although more likely to be
economically successful, migrants from the Arab world in the United States,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand share points of similarity with those in
Europe, as well as other groups who sustain assaults on their human dignity
in attempting to better their lives and feed their families. In other words,
Arab world migrants in search of dignity, freedom, and opportunity find
an array of shared social and political barriers and exclusions irrespective
of varying state ideologies, policies, and opportunity structures. In the
“countries of immigration,” they are more likely to find employment and
educational opportunities, and to report that they find political freedom,
but face a range of indignities tied to dominant understandings around
race and anti-Muslim mobilizations.53
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Nonetheless, return migration to the Arab world from all of these countries is relatively small, mainly due to the same reasons that launched the
Arab uprisings: authoritarianism, corruption, blocked aspirations, obstructed
possibilities, and social inequalities.54 Permanent return is replaced instead
by life cycle stage-related circular migration and short-term visits to the
homeland. These are the occasions when, beyond remittances and business
ventures, migrants leave their strongest qualitative imprints on the nations
they left, if only in the physical sense. Despite often hostile political conditions and economic challenges, especially for low-skilled migrants, return
rates are low. Skilled and unskilled migration from the Arab world to Europe
continues, and is increasing sharply between Morocco and Italy and Spain
(where labor force participation rates are higher).55
Smaller Migrations
There are, of course, many other contemporary movements of persons from
the Arab world to places outside of it, though smaller in volume than to
the OECD countries discussed above. Some are ongoing movements that
commenced decades or even centuries ago, some are emergent, some highly
circular, and some short-term, provoked by crisis. According to the Global
Migrant Origin Database of the Development Research Centre, these nonOECD migrants represent about eighteen percent (2.3 million) of current
Arab world migrants. Some prominent examples include Lebanese migrations to Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, Yemeni migrations to Indonesia,
Singapore, and Malaysia, Omani migrations to Zanzibar, and Lebanese,
Syrian, and Palestinian migrations to Central and South America and
the Caribbean. These migrations are not covered in detail in this section
because the needed data are more difficult to access, non-comparable, or
based on unreliable estimates. While these movements are significant for
scholars, they are minor from the perspective of migration data collectors,
who focus on the largest migrant groups in each state and on first-generation
immigrants. For example, while Arab migrations to Latin America and the
Caribbean are highly significant for scholars, they are not even mentioned in
reports on current migration patterns in these countries. The same applies
to reports on migration patterns within Africa, outside of North Africa.56
While the relative size of current Arab world migrations may be small in
these places (as compared to other migrating groups), this does not render
these migratory movements qualitatively unimportant. In fact, they are quite
significant when one considers their longer history and their size—some
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being quite large covering multiple generations—and their deeply transnational character. Counting becomes more complicated in multi-generational
diasporas. Many matters come into play, such as how second, third, and
fourth generations identify themselves, and in the case, for example, of
Arabs in Malaysia, how generations dating back centuries view themselves.
Surely varying state ideologies and policies as well as historic patterns of
assimilation, inter-marriage, resilience, exclusion, conflict, nationalism, and
transnationalism play a role in identity constructions and reconstructions.
Since state policies and ideological dispositions toward internal population
groups are interwoven with official counting mechanisms, 57 we need to
discern how the state counts the descendants of immigrants—what questions does it ask? Due to these complexities and limitations with regard
to quantitative data, I have placed discussion of these migrations in the
“Diaspora” section below.
The diaspora perspective offers a wider lens than analyses of current
migrations. It observes multiple generations and locations, just as the
transnational perspective removes the fixity of assumptions of one-way
migratory movement and permanently severed human relationships. Both
of these perspectives have great potential to capture the complexities of
human migration, especially how culture, state policies, and notions of
home and belonging have intersected and changed over time. We know
from a large body of research that the children of migrants born in the new
place of residence (or migrating there by the mid-teens) develop social and
psychological attachments to it—sometimes it is the only place they know
well—even if they face discriminatory treatment. They are far more likely
than their migrating parents to learn the local language and adopt aspects
of local culture, even when it is vastly different from that of their parents,
their parents disapprove, and they and their parents are denied membership as citizens. Here, the complexities of hybridity, notions of home, and
senses of belonging move to the forefront of qualitative scholarship. The
common preference of the children of migrants to stay in the countries where
they were born or raised poses challenges to their identity constructions.
Undoubtedly the vicissitudes of local context matter to this process. This
second-generation desire to stay creates additional tensions for migrants
who want to return; doing so will likely split the family apart, repeating
the pain of separation and the struggle of adjustment they experienced
years back and separating the elderly from their caretaking offspring. As
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noted above, overall patterns show that Arab migrants residing outside of
the Arab world have tended to remain outside, or to come and go. Surely
economic reasons are not the sole factor in this pattern.
In some places that Arab world migrants go, however, return is both
the norm and the mandate. In these places, social and political membership
are not even remote possibilities for migrants, who are informed a priori
that there is no room to aspire for more than that what their visa or paperless status will allow.58 Here, human beings on the same quest for dignity,
agency, and autonomy as all others are called labor migrants, contractual
employees, or illegals. The state and host citizenry treat them as persons
whose needs are limited to a paycheck and whose capabilities can be justifiably circumscribed, when the main way in which they are actually different
from other migrants is in their lesser set of civil, social, political, cultural,
and economic rights. Here we turn to Arab world migrations and diasporas
within the Arab world. I suggest that instead of speaking of “labor migrants”
or “contract workers,” as is the common pattern, we should more accurately
speak of labor migrant and contract worker states, for it is the state that
defines the difference and not the migrant.
Arab World Migrations and Diasporas within the Arab
World: Demographic and Social Parameters
Migrant Worker States and Forced Displacements

Nearly half (forty-five percent or 5.8 million) of the current estimated thirteen
million Arab migrants live in the Arab world, mostly in GCC countries, 59
but also increasingly in Jordan and Lebanon, according to the Development
Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty (2007 data).60 A
majority of these migrants are from the Mashriq—here defined as Egypt, Iraq,
Jordan, Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, and Yemen—
and Sudan, and a majority of Mashriq migrants live in Arab countries.61
Egyptians comprised the numerically largest group: some seventy percent
of the reported 2.7 million Egyptian migrants lived in Arab countries in
2000, forty-eight percent of whom were in Saudi Arabia, twelve percent
in Jordan, and two percent in Libya.62 A 1988 study found that Egyptian
migrants living in the Gulf states held low-wage jobs and had high rates
of turnover, distinguishing them from the Palestinians, Jordanians, and
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Syrians in these countries.63 As noted above, migrants from the Maghrib
are more likely to live in Europe than in the Arab world (or anywhere else),
although some one million of them live in other Arab countries.64
The GCC states are the “migrant-importing” countries of the Arab world
(as well as Libya pre-2011). They rank among the top countries globally for
the proportion of migrants relative to their native-born populations.65 Qatar
ranked first globally on the measure of percentage of its population being
foreign-born, with 86.5 percent, followed by the United Arab Emirates,
with seventy percent, and Kuwait, with sixty-nine percent. Ranking fourth
and fifth are Jordan and the occupied Palestinian territories with forty-six
percent and forty-four percent foreign-born, respectively, about which I
will say more below. Following Singapore (forty-one percent), Israel (forty
percent), and Hong Kong (thirty-nine percent), Oman and Saudi Arabia
round out the top ten, with 28.4 percent and 27.8 percent foreign-born,
respectively. This statistically significant and otherwise unlikely regional
concentration of nations with high ratios of foreign-born residents is the
result of three inter-related phenomena: the presence of globally valued
natural resources sealed within fixed boundaries of proclaimed national
ownership; exclusivist states and notions of nationalism; and demographic
dispossession and war.
Since all Arab states grant citizenship principally through the notion of
jus sanguinis or blood rights, and in most cases through the father’s line only
(Yemen and Egypt are exceptions), children of migrants born on their soils
remain foreigners, and migrants’ access to full social and political rights is
highly limited.66 The foreign-born in the GCC countries are officially defined
as temporary labor migrants, a categorization that has driven most of the
social research about them. The high rates of “foreign-born” in Jordan and
the occupied Palestinian territories are the result of demographic dispossession and war; most of them are Palestinians—whether refugees, displaced,
or returnees after being born abroad, especially following the 1990-91 Gulf
War.67 Thus, the category “foreign-born” obscures the Palestinian diaspora
in motion, a population characterized by multiple instances of uprooting.
The post-1973 economic boom in the oil-rich states of the GCC beckoned
migrants because the requisite skilled and unskilled labor was unavailable locally. Large numbers of Yemenis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Jordanians,
Palestinians, and Iraqis (with smaller numbers from other Arab countries)
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responded to this call. Together they designed, built, managed, cleaned, and
otherwise staffed schools, hospitals, ports, hotels, banks, communication
and transportation networks, and internal commercial sectors. The flow
of Arab world migrants to these states doubled in the years between 1975
and 1980.68 Some of these were family migrations while others were predominantly male migrations, varying by host country policy and national
group. For example, Palestinians and Jordanians in Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia tended to migrate as families. Yemenis and Egyptians moving to any
GCC destination tended to migrate autonomously. A range of state policies,
employment strategies, and economic structures, for example the kafala
(sponsorship) system, kept these Arab world migrants in social, economic,
and political statuses unequal to nationals. Nonetheless, whether low-wage
unskilled workers or highly paid professionals, their incomes produced
sufficient surpluses to enable sending remittances back home. Indeed, the
value of remittances from Arab world migrants is higher than the value
of regional trade.69 For example, “remittances sent to Jordan, Egypt and
Lebanon from other Arab countries are forty to 190 per cent higher than
trade revenues between these and other Arab countries.”70 Put another way,
the movement of people and the capital they earn is significantly greater
than the movement of goods across the Arab world—human beings are the
“dynamic economic factors” of the region.71
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent political alignments around it led to the displacement of a substantial proportion of Arab
world migrants in GCC countries, most permanently. GCC countries have
expelled up to one million Yemenis (from Saudi Arabia), 200,000 Jordanians
(including of Palestinian origin) and 150,000 Palestinians, mainly from
Kuwait, as well as Iraqis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Yemenis, and Sudanese
from elsewhere.72 Asian migrants and nationals steadily replaced Arab
migrants, with nationals increasingly able and willing to work in government
positions and in occupations in which Arabic was required (such as schools,
commerce, journalism, and media). The proportion of migrants in the GCC
who were from the Arab world was reduced overall to thirty-two percent
by the early 2000s: it went from ninety-one percent (1975) to thirty-three
percent (2004) in Saudi Arabia and eighty percent (1975) to thirty percent
(2003) in Kuwait, and from smaller proportions to ten percent or less in
the UAE and Oman.73
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These demographic changes did not occur because of a shortage
of persons in the Arab world seeking work in these countries, nor were
they an outcome of a shortage of jobs (although the demand for labor has
decreased since the 1990s). They are due to the GCC governments’ concerted
de-Arabization policies. These policies shrunk the world of possibilities for
persons from Arab states in their quests for dignity and autonomy. Consider
that the Arab world holds both the global leaders in the category of labor
migrant states and one of the world’s highest average regional unemployment rates.74 Youth, many of them well-educated and skilled, were the
largest component of the more than fourteen million unemployed in the
Arab world.75 The IOM concluded in its 2010 World Migration Report:
“relatively high literacy rates and youth unemployment ranging between 14
and 50 percent, indicates that the Mashriq will remain a source of young
migrants—a significant proportion of them skilled migrants.”76 The inverse
relationship between migration and rebellion, and how human dignity
stands at its pivot, could not be clearer.
GCC countries also stand out globally for having the lowest ratios of
female to male migrants, a pattern replicated in the “Middle East”77 overall.78
Although women have comprised nearly half of the world’s migrants for
more than forty years,79 they make up only twenty-one percent of migrants
in Oman, twenty-six percent in Qatar, twenty-seven percent in the United
Arab Emirates, thirty percent each in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and thirtythree percent in Bahrain.80 These asymmetrical data signal the absence of
migrant families and the presence of highly gendered migrant social worlds
in the GCC. A large proportion of these female migrants are recruited
for household work based on a perception of their capacity to love and
nurture others’ children. Most are not from the Arab world. In their quest
to provide better lives for their own families they are forced to leave their
children behind. Their love is the gold they have to sell, as sociologist Arlie
Hochschild has articulated.81
Home to Forced Migrants and the Displaced

The Arab world also stands out in the field of migration because it is the
home to the largest number of forced migrants in the world, including both
refugees and internally displaced people. Nearly one quarter of the world’s
refugees lived in “the Middle East region” in 2008.82 While 7.6 percent of
all migrants globally are refugees, they are seventy-seven percent of the
(8.7 million) migrants living in the Mashriq.83 The Sudan had the largest
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number internally displaced persons, with 4.9 million in 2010, despite a
drop of 1.1 million persons, and Iraq had the third largest (after Columbia),
with 2.76 million.84 There are also an estimated 160,000 internally displaced
Palestinians, and some 60,000 to 90,000 currently at risk of displacement.85
It is indeed sobering for those who study the peoples of the Arab world to
recognize that they constitute the largest number of refugees and displaced
people in the world today. The majority live in places where blocked aspirations, political voicelessness, and challenges to human dignity are daily and
salient. It is incumbent upon us to address how these challenges are similar
to and different from the challenges of being an Arab world migrant in
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, Malaysia, or Latin America.
Knowledge about Arab Migrants in Labor Migrant States

The qualitative English-language social science literature on Arab world
migrants living inside the Arab world is strikingly different from scholarship on migrants living outside of it. Studies of migrants outside of the
Arab world have pursued with much more breadth and vigor questions
of cultural, economic, civic, and political belonging, social integration,
economic mobility, institutional development, material culture, leisure
pursuits, meaning, identities and hybridities, inter-group relationships
and solidarities, transnational ties, social class, gender, and sexualities (in
a nascent stage)—the very anthropologies and sociologies of daily life. In
the case of Arab world migrants living inside the region, state policies, work,
and human rights are central foci. Certainly, when political membership is a
priori ruled out, belonging is reserved for a select few, and social integration
is highly bounded, these research topics may seem less provocative. Yet we
should consider comparatively the ways in which these conditions and their
outcomes are similar to and different from those of Arab world migrants in
Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, Africa, Latin America, and
Southeast Asia. We should give equal effort to understanding the ways in
which Arab world migrants join with others to give meaning to their lives,
no matter where they are living. Putting state policies aside, is it the case that
Arab world migrants living within the region prefer to return home more
than those living in Europe or the United States, where anti-Arab racism
and Islamophobia rage? Based on our scholarship, questions of “home” are
more prevalent and profound among Arab world migrants living in places
where they have more fully articulated social lives and permanent residency
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or citizenship. Is this really the case, and if so, why? We should endeavor
to better spell out the similarities and differences between the daily life
experiences of Arab migrants living within and outside of the Arab world,
as well as how these inform group memberships, solidarities, meaning, and
notions of belonging and of home.
Questions we might ask of Arab world migrants living within the
Arab world include: How do social and political exclusions play out in their
everyday lives? Are there any points of inclusion, even if these are officially
discouraged? What daily actions do migrants take to resist dehumanization
and maintain their sense of dignity? Do women deploy different strategies
than men? What types of hierarchies exist among migrants? What types of
social communities do Arab world migrants in Arab countries form, and
how important is nationality, gender, religion, sexuality, and social class in
these formations? What material culture and social institutions have they
produced? How do they manifest and practice religiosity? How do they
manage relationships with other migrant groups? What are the leisure and
cultural pursuits of Arab migrants living in other Arab countries? What
are their dreams? Despite their liminal status, they surely remain active
creators and producers of culture. Addressing these and other questions
will more fully complicate and humanize migrants living in the Arab world.
We know these migrants in a unidimensional way as homo economicus.
In sum, relative to our knowledge of Arab world migrants in other
places, we know less of the complexities and depths of these migrants’
lives outside of that reified social category of “labor migrant.” As I have
suggested, this category more appropriately defines state policies and
not the migrants. Similarly, we know less of the worlds of work for Arab
migrants outside of the Arab world than we do for those within. We must
begin with the assumption that, whether within or without the Arab world,
the worlds of migrants whose hearts and souls are split across geographic
and cultural spaces are equally complex. A comprehensive understanding
of the current social conditions of Arab world migrations and diasporas
demands that our inquiries be more internally harmonious. They should
not vary by country of resettlement, nor should social categories on the
official schemata of migrants set limits on the contours of our work. When
we resist what categories deny, we allow all Arab migrants to remain social,
cultural, civil, and political equals.
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Global Arab World Diasporas
The Arab world diaspora located outside of the region is roughly composed
of some thirty to thirty-seven million people: that is nearly three times the
total number of current Arab world migrants, ten percent of the current
Arab world population, or the populations of Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan
combined (see map).86 If we add to this total the number of current Arab
world migrants and second-, third-, and fourth-generation Palestinians who
are dispersed throughout the Arab world, a rough estimate of the Arab world
diaspora would approach forty to fifty million persons. Arab world diasporic
communities are numerically largest in places where native-born descendants of prior migrant generations substantially outnumber current migrants.
This is the case among Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian communities in the
Caribbean and Central and South America, as well as Yemenis in Malaysia
and Indonesia. Since these diasporas are heavily composed of second-, third-,
and fourth-generation descendants of migrants, large proportions of them are
born into the hybridities of mixed ethnicity and/or migrant and non-migrant
fusion. Many have never visited their diasporic homelands. Their identities, homeland ties, movements, material cultures, literature, poetry, social,
political, economic, and cultural institutions, even their sports teams (see
the film Goal Dreams87) have been subjects of research, particularly among
scholars of history, cultural studies, and comparative literature. The lens of
diaspora studies is well suited to the study of these groups, given its focus
on the simultaneity of notions of home and away, on cultural production,
hybridities, memory, and imagination, and the ways in which these figure
into defining and redefining the “we” of those communities. Transnational
perspectives are similarly fruitful for developing our understandings of the
circularity rather than stasis of migration, the impact of homeland on those
abroad, of those abroad on homeland, the meanings of borders and multiple
locations, as well as the “challenges and delights of embracing multiple
psychic locations.”88
Yemeni and Omani diasporas in Asia go back centuries and scholars link
them to the early spread of Islam, with the Yemeni evolving into both trade
and labor diasporas over time.89 By most accounts, the Levantine (Lebanese,
Syrian, Palestinian) diasporas started modestly in the seventeenth century
and expanded significantly in the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries,
and are usually tied to commercial developments. Diaspora scholar Robin
Cohen calls them “trade diasporas” since they are built by interdependent
networks of merchants who mediate between the cultures of buyers and
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sellers and remain culturally distinct from the host society, somewhat akin
to Bonacich’s concept of “middleman minorities.”90 In Cohen’s model, trade
diasporas would no longer retain this appellation once their communities
assimilate to the host society or cease to engage in trade, a proposition that
appears ripe for continuing research given the broad range of the Levantine
diaspora. Cohen considers the continuing cycle of departure and return among
Lebanese as “virtually unprecedented in populations so widely dispersed.”91
He notes that, “over about one-quarter of self-declared Lebanese do not live
in Lebanon at any one time” a formula that might refer only to Lebaneseborn nationals, because the Lebanese diaspora is many times larger than the
population in Lebanon.92 Cohen shows low and high estimates for Lebanese
in France, Brazil, West Africa, Argentina, Australia, Canada, the Gulf/Saudi
Arabia, and the United States. These estimates add up to a Lebanese diaspora
that ranges from a low of about eight million to a high of twenty-two million.93
The Lebanese population in Lebanon at the time (in 1991) was about 2.9
million.94 The Palestinian diaspora has roots in commerce and maintains a
commercial character in some places, but its current magnitude and regional
concentration are the result of expulsion and dispossession caused by the
creation of Israel and later Israeli policies.
Arab world diaspora scholars tend to study communities living outside of
the Arab world—with the significant exceptions of the Palestinian, Armenian,
Assyrian, and Iraqi diasporas—even though migration data tell us that large
diasporic populations live within the region. A significant exception to this
pattern is Brand’s treatment of Arab state policies, or lack thereof, vis-á-vis
their diasporic populations.95 Diaspora studies scholars’ prominent interest
in histories and in the linkages, attachments, meaning-making, and cultural
products of descendant generations may explain this tendency. So, too, may
the continued draw of pan-Arab ideas, which infer that an Arab diaspora
cannot exist inside the Arab world, just as the notion of umma implies that
there can be no “Muslim diaspora.” Shedding the diaspora light on the Arab
world requires engaging painful questions around the shared and the exclusive.
When we deconstruct the logic behind the shared and unbounded qualities of
language, food, music, poetry, literature, and film, alongside the exclusivity
of material resources that lie within arbitrarily bounded nation-states, we
locate part of the explanation for the simultaneity of high labor demand and
high unemployment within the Arab world.
While the study of Arab world diasporas tends to focus on the social action
and cultural production of multiple generations outside the “homeland,” the
fact of multiple generations is not a requirement for deploying a diasporic
lens. In the social sciences, diasporas are distinguished not by generations
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but by persistent identities and social and emotional ties to a homeland,96
and by forms of consciousness, social forms, and cultural production.97
These analytic concerns could be applied to migrants from Arab countries
living within the Arab world, whether Syrians in Kuwait, Jordanians in the
Emirates, Egyptians in Jordan, Lebanese in Egypt, or Yemenis in Saudi Arabia,
were we to consistently take a harder look at the ethnographies of their daily
lives. Instead, as noted above, our dominant focus has been on work and
government policies—such as those limiting residency, family reunification,
ownership of property, and political activity. This focus implicitly signals an
acceptance that “labor migrants” are somehow different from other migrants
and cannot be examined from a diasporic perspective.98 Brand has noted that
transnational studies have “not had much impact on Middle Eastern studies.”99
Here referring to Arab state policies toward their own diasporic populations,
Brand notes: “If civil, economic, and political rights of the average national
are given short shrift on home turf, why should one expect the Arab state
to engage in substantially different behavior toward nationals abroad?”100
As scholars, we could advance the study of Arab world diasporas by
refining our understandings of how ideologies, policies, cultures, and interpretations intersect to produce different outcomes in different places. Why
does the Arab world diaspora in much of Latin American and the Caribbean
look qualitatively different in terms of social and political integration than it
does in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Europe, and West
Africa? For example, when compared to their social positions in other diasporic
locations outside of the Arab world, the Lebanese, Syrian, and Palestinian
communities in the Caribbean and Central and South America appear to
be the most socially and politically integrated, to have the highest rates of
intermarriage with the local population, and to have achieved the highest
levels of political office, although a comparison with, for example, Yemenis
in Southeast Asia may reveal similar patterns.101 Do we really understand the
ways in which Arab world diasporas in Malaysia and Indonesia are similar
to and different from those in other locations? Scholars seeking answers to
questions not only of “what” but “why,” who want to understand process
and causality with regard to racialization, language and culture retention,
identities, and social and political integration, need information on the ways
in which local and global context shape social behavior. Developing this
understanding requires attending to policies and patterns historically and
comparing them across time and place. Considerable research lies ahead for
scholars in the exploration and comparison of the contours of similarity and
difference situated in place, and their implications for social life across the
wide-ranging global Arab world diaspora.
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Table 2: Estimates of the Size of Global Arab World Diasporas by Country of
Residence, Indicating Country of Origin of Major Constituent Groups a
Compiled by Louise Cainkar
Argentina b
Lebanon and Syria

1 million – 3.5 million

Australia c
Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Syria

400,000 – 1 million

Brazil d
Lebanon, Syria, Palestine
Note: Brazil’s population of Lebanese descent may be larger
than Lebanon’s population.

1.5 million – 12 million

Canada e
Lebanon, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Palestine

375,000 – 500,000

Chile f
Palestine
Note: Estimated fourth largest Palestinian population in the
world after Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan

300,000 – 800,000

El Salvador g
Palestine

150,000

Europe and UK h
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen

9 million - 14 million

Honduras i
Palestine
Note: Highest proportion of Arabs in one country in the
Western Hemisphere

100,000 - 200,000

Indonesia j
Yemen and Oman
Note: Commenced in the eleventh century

4 million – 5 million

Ivory Coast k
Lebanon

90,000 – 100,000

Jordan l
Palestine, Iraq

2.8 million Palestinians
450,000 – 500,000 Iraqis

Lebanon m
Palestine

260,000 – 280,000
(registered refugees)

Mexico n
Lebanon

380,000 – 1 million

Senegal o
Lebanon

15,000 – 30,000

Sierra Leone p
Lebanon

4,000 – 20,000

Singapore q
Yemen and Oman

10,000

United States r
Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, Iraq

1.5 million – 3 million

Venezuela s
Lebanon, Syria

400,000

Yemen t
Somalis

221,500 (registered refugees)

Other significant Arab world diaspora
diaspora communities
communitiesare
arefound in Columbia, Venezuela, Cuba, the Dofound
in Republic,
Columbia,Ecuador,
Venezuela,
Cuba,
the Dominican
Republ
minican
Haiti,
Jamaica,
Trinidad and
Tobago, Panama,u Malaysia,v the Philippines w
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a
Composed by author based on one or more scholarly, official, or credible non-web English language
sources for each country, and is non-exhaustive. Numerous web-based sources of various degrees of
credibility may be located using search engines; they are not referenced here. This table was composed
using destination country and Arab country of origin as its data collection criteria. This method of
data collection results in the exclusion of two large diasporic groups associated with the Arab world:
Armenians and Assyrians. Armenians are not originally from the Arab world, but have had a significant presence in a number of Arab countries. Estimates of their current numbers are provided as
follows: Russia: 2 million, US: 800,000, Georgia: 400,000, France: 250,000, the Ukraine: 150,000, Lebanon: 150,000, Iran: 100,000, Syria: 70,000, Argentina: 60,000, Turkey: 60,000, Canada: 40,000, Australia: 30,000. See Khachig Tölöyan, “Elites and Institutions in the Armenian Transnation,” Diaspora:
A Journal of Transnational Studies 9, no. 1 (2000), 107-136. Assyrians are indigenous to parts of the
modern day Arab world. Historic Assyria is located in an area that is in today’s Iraq, Syria, Iran, and
Turkey. Short of reliable numbers, one can report that half of the Assyrian people live outside the
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In Table 2, I have compiled some of the available estimates of the largest
current Arab world diasporas by place, noting the numerically dominant
groups in each location. As with all migrant demographics, these numbers
should be approached prudently. The greater the number of generations
in diaspora, the greater the likelihood of error within and non-comparability across place, since the subject being counted is not always the same.
Considerations include whether immigrant, native-born, or third-generation
and beyond; single or mixed parentage; citizens, dual nationals, or residents;
self-identified or attributed; Arab by ethnicity or Arab country national; and
so on. Reported estimates for a number of countries vary widely (or wildly).
These numbers, then, are most useful to gain a sense of the proportion and
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reach of current Arab diasporas, although only the largest diasporic locations and largest groups are included in the table, excluding many others
smaller in dimension. A worthwhile scholarly project, yet one ripe with
substantial challenges, would consist in attempting to get a comparable
handle on these numbers and filling in the missing data.
Conclusion
Producing a quantitative overview of global Arab world migrations and
diasporas is a daunting task. There are so many peoples, places, categories,
and definitions, and so little consistency across time and place. Any attempt
to produce a comprehensive global portrait of the far-reaching historical
and contemporary Arab migrations and diasporas must necessarily sacrifice a substantial amount of depth and detail and engage instead in broad
generalities. As a scholar of Arab migrations and diasporas who strives for
rigor, I am as unsatisfied with this performance as another reader might
be. Nonetheless, it is a necessary exercise that serves to situate the work of
other scholars in a global context.
If this overview highlights anything, it is the need for yet more work
that deploys a range of scholarly paradigms while at the same time considers
what we need to know to advance global and cross-cultural comparisons. I
have shown that defining our research interests by official migrant categories
and by place has produced non-comparable bodies of literature. My incessant repetition of the word “migrant”—instead of using terms like refugee,
guest worker, contract laborer, asylee, immigrant, emigrant, family migrant,
transnational, or diasporic subject—has been painful for a writer who prefers
precision and invoking the passion that accompanies the meanings of these
terms. But I have done this to make a point. By deconstructing how we have
been looking at Arab world migrations and diasporas, I suggest that while
place matters and immigrant type may be important, and both should be
clearly defined, neither should drive our research questions. When we set
out to discover, rather than impose, what has meaning, we enhance global,
comparative, and cross-disciplinary conversations about what matters for
migrants and their descendants. I have also suggested that human dignity
is one broadly generalizable overarching concern, stated or unstated, that
is shared in our collective body of research. We might consider stating this
concern up front.
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Similarly, I have used the concept Arab world migrant instead of Arab
migrant to highlight the fact that many people who are not Arab live in and
migrant to and from the Arab world, which also hosts a number of diasporic
communities. Overall, the Arab world receives less credit than it deserves for
hosting, mostly harmoniously, a diverse range of peoples, including millions
of refugees and displaced peoples. It is cosmopolitan and contrapuntal in
its own ways.102 Similarly, some have mistaken the draw of economic and
educational opportunities in Europe and the “countries of immigration” as
proof of their cultural attraction or even superiority. While these features
that allow people to act on their human capabilities, as well as political
freedoms, may indeed be strong pull factors, their lure does not signal a
rejection of homeland. Indeed, that abiding love is part of what continually
draws migrants and their children back, whether physically or emotionally.
No matter how secure a migrant or diaspora community feels in its
adopted home, the risk of collective attack or mass expulsion is always present.
States and social movements that thrive on maintaining the otherness of
migrants and their families frequently thwart migrants’ efforts to maintain
dignity. History has repeatedly shown that an original otherness, even long
obscured, can be resurrected with passion through social constructions
promoted by persons acting on political and economic interests. This is the
double-edged sword of “difference”; it offers dignity at the same time that
it actively makes distinctions between people. There are also risks that war
and conflict will threaten the perceived safety of the new home. In the past
two decades we have seen mass exoduses of Palestinians, Jordanians, and
Yemenis from the Gulf states, Lebanese from Sierra Leone, Palestinians from
Libya and Iraq, new Iraqi, Sudanese, Somali, Syrian, and Libyan diasporas
in the making, and 15,000 Arabs and Muslims in the United States issued
deportation orders after the September 11 attacks.
Migration is part of the perennial human quest for dignity and autonomy.
It is not a simple option, nor one that is appealing or available to everyone.
While it serves as a pressure-relieving valve, it does not resolve the fundamental problems of stagnant economies, elite corruption, massive foreign debt,
inadequate development, authoritarianism, racism, inequality, hegemony,
and lack of freedom that limit human capabilities and compel people to
seek other options. One analyst predicted that Arab migration to Europe
would increase due to the growing Arab “youth bulge” if Arab governments
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did not find a way to “integrate youth into their development strategies.”103
Otherwise, Aymen Zohry warned, the outcome might be “violence and civil
war, as in Rwanda and other sub-Saharan countries.”104 Recent events in the
Arab world have shown that there is a third way in the unstoppable human
quest for dignity, perhaps unthinkable just a few years ago. That third way
is the largely non-violent, youth-led revolutions that have taken place. These
mobilizations for change started in the Arab countries where unemployment
was among the highest and then made their way to the migrant-importing
countries of Libya and the Arab GCC, revealing an organic relationship
among young generations across the Arab world.
Poets and creative writers may be better at conveying the deep and
complex social-psychological and emotional states of the migrant and
diasporic subject. But scholars are well suited to capture the ways in which
technology has built bridges between migrant and homeland, rendering
the emotional rupture potentially less severe and the cultural connection
stronger. Migrants today are less likely than in the past to have to relinquish
physical and emotional ties to their homelands. This is in part because communication and transportation advances no longer require it, refashioning
the meaning of yearning for home. The possibilities of faster air travel
and lower-cost communication between the leavers and the left facilitate
transnational associations, mutual visits, and circular migration—although
some suggest that ease of communication may make physical separation
more painful. Vonage, Magic Jack, Facebook, text messaging, YouTube, and
Twitter, all made possible by global technological advances, have elided great
distances and allowed migrants and their descendants greater participation
in life “back home,” including in their struggles for human dignity and
social justice.105 Technological changes have certainly produced other social
transformations, both positive and negative for human dignity, which we
have only begun to document.
Technology has altered some of the contours, qualities, and reach of
human migration, yet it has not altered its underlying character as a movement in search of something better, especially when it feels unachievable
where one is. Technology has also not changed the requirement of grand
sacrifice—being torn apart from deep human bonds, separated from the
familiar, and socially transformed from a member (even if an alienated one)
into a stranger—that accompanies crossing into new physical spaces and
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social geographies. It is artists, poets, and novelists that have best articulated
how these separations from family and community, from the intimate and
the known, are profound emotional and social psychological ruptures. In
the simple yet profound words of Mahmoud Darwish: “My country is not
a suitcase. I am not a traveler; I am the lover and the land is the beloved.”106
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